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RIGHTS OF AN INDORSEE "FOR DEPOSIT" AGAINST THE DRAWER
IN Atlantic City National Bank v. Commercial Lumber Co., a buyer of
goods gave his note for the price to the seller, who discounted it at his bank.
The note was payable at the buyer's bank. The buyer not being in funds
just before the note's maturity, the seller gave his check payable to the
buyer for the amount of the note, thereby putting him in funds. The check
was deposited indorsed "For deposit only to the credit of" the payee in
his bank which paid the note on presentment. But when the buyer
breached his agreement with the seller to put him in funds to cover the
check on its presentment, the seller stopped payment. - In an action by
the bank against the drawer the defense of no consideration was made on
the theory that it was available against the bank because the indorsement
was restrictive.3 The court agreed that the indorsement was restrictive4 but
held that the drawer was estopped from denying his liability because he had
put the buyer in a position where he could obtain credit.
Since the check was given for accommodation the result of the instant case
is inescapable. Even a mere assignee for value, who is also given only the
rights of his transferor, is not subject to the defense of accommodation,5 and
it would therefore seem that, as far as this defense is concerned, it is im-
material whether the indorsement is restrictive or not. The pertinent in-
quiry then is whether the bank acted on the check as the drawer intended
it to, or in other words whether value has been given the payee on the
strength of the check; 6 and in the instant case that was done. 7 This inter-
'155 Atl. 762 (N. J. 1931).
2 The buyer was to deliver a certified check to the seller. The transaction
was styled by counsel for the plaintiff as a "kiting" transaction. Counsel
for the defendant stated its purpose was to avoid the embarrassment of
protest.
3 § 37 of the Negotiable Instruments Law: "A restrictive indorsement
confers upon the indorsee the right . (2) to bring any action .. . the
indorser could bring."
4 Accord: First National Bank v. Morrell & Co., 53 S. D. 496, 221 N. W.
95 (1928). Contra: Security Bank v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 58 Mlinn.
141, 59 N. W. 987 (1894); Ditch -. Western National Bank, 79 Md. 192,
29 Atl. 72 (1894); (1929) 27 ICtH. L. REv. 333.
5Meggett v. Baum, 57 Bliss. 22 (1879) ; Hughes v. Nelson, 29 N. J. Eq.
547 (1878); cf. Freund v. Importers' and Traders' National Bank, 76 N. Y.
352 (1879); Matthias v. Kirsch, 87 Ale. 523 (1895) (renewal notes).
See BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTE AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) 342, 438. Under
§ 29 of the N. I. L. an accommodation party "is liable to a holder for
value notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument
knew him to be only an accommodation party." A rather abstruse argument
may be made from this section in support of the instant case on the theory
that the section only requires the status of holder for value, not holder in
due course, for recovery from the accommodating party. This view has ap-
parently been adopted in the after-maturity cases, but is generally con-
sidered unsatisfactory. See Brannan, Some Necessary Amcndmnclts to the
N. . L. (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 493, 497. In at least one state the words
"holder in due course" have been substituted for "holder for value." Mass.
[301]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
pretation of the case may well be what the court meant when it upheld an
estoppel against the drawer to deny his liability, and there is nothing in the
Negotiable Instruments Law that would destroy the validity of the fore-
going argument.8
Where the defense is one other than accommodation, however, it has been
held 9 that it is available against the restrictive indorsee, even though he
may have met all other requirements for a holder in due course, by reason
of Sections 37 (2) and 47.1o This seems a sound result if the restrictive
indorsement is to be regarded as a mere common law assignment which pos-
sesses none of the attributes of a law merchant indorsement, the words of
restriction serving as a mere memorandum."1 But dicta in the instant ease
Gen. Laws (1921) 107.52. A better view is that Section 29 is not for the pur-
pose of describing who may recover from the accommodating party and
an amendment eliminating such an implication from the statute has been
suggested. See Turner, Revision of the N. I. L. (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 25, 40.
7 There is considerable conflict as to what facts are essential to show
whether a bank has given value or not when it receives an item for deposit.
Comment (1929) 33 YALE L. J. 628; BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLM INSTRUMENTS
LAW (4th Ed. 1926) 386. It is apparently well settled that facts such
as in the instant case constitute the bank a holder for value in Now
-Jersey. Hoffman v. First National Bank, 46 N. J. L. 604 (1884). This
discussion assumes that the bank has given value.
8 It has been doubted whether § 49 of the N. I. L. would permit a mere
assignee to recover from an accommodating party because of the negative
implication of the section which gives such a transferee "such title as the
transferor had therein." Ames, Negotiable Instnrments Law (1900) 14
HARv. L. REV. 241, 250. Under the English Bill of Exchange Act,
containing a section identical to § 49, this result has not been reached,
Hood v. Stewart, 17 Session Cases (4th Series) 749 (1890); Walters v.
Neary, 21 T. L. R. 146 (1904); see Earl v. Fletcher National Bank, 70
Ind. App. 559, 123 N. E. 706 (1919); Townsend v. Alevel (Mo. App.),
202 S. W. 447 (1918).
) Werner Piano Co. v. Henderson & Reese, 121 Ark. 165, 180 S. W. 495
(1915) (agency type of restrictive indorsement) ; Smith v. Bayer, 46 Ore.
143, 79 Pac. 497 (1905) (same); Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170
Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93 (1919) (trustee type). But cf. Midwest National
Bank and Trust Co. v. Niles & Watters Savings Bank, 190 Iowa 752, 180
N. W. 880 (1921) (restrictive indorsee allowed to recover from drawee
free of defense of fraud after drawee had accepted). Before the N. L L.
the restrictive indorsee was denied the right to be a holder in due course.
Wilson v. Tolson, 79 Ga. 137, 3 S. E. 900 (1887); Leary v. Blanchard, 48
Me. 269 (1860). This discussion is limited to the agency type of restric-
tive indorsement, as defined under Sec. 36 (2) of the N. I. L. For a
discussion of the same problem with regard to the trustee type, see (1021)
34 HARv. L. Ray. 84.
10 § 47 states that "An instrument negotiable in its origin continues
to be negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed . . ." Its use in
these cases seems to be that of only a make-weight argument. The court
in the instant case rides over it rough-shod by simply stating it is too
"brpad." Its repeal has been proposed. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COlMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1931), 29. See also
Britton, Amendment to the N. I. L. (1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 815, 821.
"See White v. National. Bank, 102 U. S. 658, 662 (1880); Smith v.
Bayer, supra, note 9, at 147, 79 Pac. at 498; Werner Piano Co. v. Hen-
derson & Reese, supra note 9, at 169, 180 S. W. at 496. This view seems
inapplicable to restrictive indorsements described in Sec. 36 (1), "pro-
hibiting the further negotiation of the instrument." It also seems in-
congruous with the trustee type of restrictive indorsement, but such was
the effect, if not the rationale of Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins,
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might be taken to mean that a restrictive indorsee may qualify as a holder
in due course, on the theory that a restrictive indorsement is a regular in-
dorsement which serves only as notice of the indorser's beneficial interest,
and not as notice of equities between the immediate parties.22 This view
may be technically supported by interpreting Section 37 as not being ex-
haustive of the restrictive indorsee's rights. It has been accepted, more-
over, by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in a proposed amend-
ment to Section 37, which gives certain restrictive indorsees the right to
bring any action they could have brought had the indorsement not been
restrictive. But the agency type of restrictive indorsement, such as the
one in this case, was expressly excluded from this proposal.X3 It would seem
desirable that the amendment should include this type as well, so that an
indorsee who has qualified as a holder in due course in all other respects
will not be subject to defenses by reason of the wording of an indorsement
which could not possibly have put him on notice.
Two recent bank collection codes do not dispense with the need of such an
amendment because they do not entirely obviate the difficulties of the in-
stant case, and of similar situations. The code sponsored by the American
Bankers' Association stipulates that the "for deposit" indorsement is restric-
tive as constituting'an agency, but it gives the bank the status of "owner"
as to prior parties to the extent of credit withdrawn by reason of the in-
strument.'-' It seems doubtful that the courts will interpret "owner" as
being tantamount to "holder in due course." Another code, that proposed
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, specifically provides that
the indorsement is non-restrictive,3 but it does not purport to define the
rights of a bank on instruments deposited with it under indorsements which
the code deems restrictive, such as the indorsement "for collection", appar-
ently leaving that problem to the Negotiable Instruments Law.
CARRIEs'S BENEFIT FRO1 SHIPPER'S INSUR.ANCE-DISCnIMINATION UNIDER
INTERSTATE Co sECE AcT
FOR half a century insurance companies and carriers have struggled to
shift responsibility for loss of the shipper's insured goods in transit., The
carrier early protected its interests by incorporating within the bill of
lading a provision that it should have the full benefit of any insurance
which the shipper might effect on the goods. To the extent of the coverage
this clause operates to extinguish the shipper's rights against the carrier,
and as a consequence, to prevent the insurer from recovering by subroga-
tion against the carrier. - The insurer has retaliated by inserting in the
s=pra note 9. It most clearly applies to restrictive indorsements of the
agency type.
12 BRANNAN, op. eit. supra note 7, at 318. This view does not seem to have
been adopted in any reported case. But see Haskell v. Avery, 181 Mass. 106,
108, 63 N. E. 15, 16 (1902).
"3 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CO.SMIONERS ON UxI-
FORM STATE LAWS (1931) 28.
'4 This code has been adopted in 15 states including New Jersey. N. J.
C MP. STAT. (Supp. 1925-1930) 17-844, 17-82-2. It does not appear why
it was not referred to in the instant case.
I" Third Tentative Draft of a Uniform Bank Collection Act, See. 2,
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM.MISSIONERS ON UN1FORm
STATE LAWS (1931) 58.
I For an extensive review of the early stages of the struggle, see Note
(1924) 37 HMRv. L. REv. 901 and Note (1924) 9 IowA L. BuLL. 291.
2 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & Western Transportation Co., 117 U. S. 312,
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policy a clause which avoids the insurance in the event that the benefit
thereof has been or shall be given to the carrier.n 3 But as a safeguard
against penalizing the shipper by unenforceable insurance, the insurer has
contrived an arrangement whereby the shipper upon a loss in transit re-
ceives a payment in the nature of a loan, repayable to whatever extent
he may recover from the carrier. Payment of the insurance pursuant to
such a device guarantees the insurer the benefit of the carrier's responsi-
bility.4 The further attempt of the carrier to retain the benefit of the
shipper's insurance by a benefit clause operative only "so far as this shall
not avoid the policies" is clearly nugatory.e
The latest phase of the struggle appears in the recent case of China
Fire Insurance Company v. Davis. Goods were shipped under a bill of
lading containing the modified benefit clause and were insured by the
shipper under a policy lacking the customary avoidance clause. Upon loss
of the goods under circumstances which made the carrier liable, the shipper
collected damages from the carrier. Subsequently, concealing the fact of
the carrier's prior payment, the- shipper collected upon the policies, and
transferred the proceeds to the carrier in accordance with a previous
agreement. In an action by the insurer against the carrier for money had
and received, the court reasoned that inasmuch as the shipper had granted
the carrier a favor in the form of insurance pursuant to the benefit clause
in the bill of lading, the clause was invalid as a device for receiving the
greater compensation" prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act as
discriminatory. And since by the shipper's fraud the insurer was induced
to pay what it was not obliged to pay, the carrier was held liable.
The effect of the decision is clearly to nullify, by an invocation of the
Interstate Commerce Act, the previous attempts of the carrier to shift re-
sponsibility for loss of the shipper's goods. If the decision invalidates the
benefit clause, it must at the same time automatically reinstate the insurer's
rights as subrogee against the carrier, obviate the use of the avoidance
clause in the policy, and relegate the conflict between the two interests to
its original status. Controversies based on discrimination have ordinarily
arisen between shipper and carrier directly over a matter of rates or
service, and while in such cases the courts have uniformly recognizcd the
policy of the Act as superior to the enforceability of an otherwise valid
contract, in no case have they extended that prophylactic policy to a situa-
tion quite so remote from the rate transaction as the present one. There
6 Sup. Ct. 750 (1886). But cf. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. V. Gulf,
C. & S. F. Ry., 63 Tex. 475 (1885), where the bill of lading was issued
before the policy.
3 Fayerweather v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N. Y. 324, 23 N. E. 192 (1890).
4 Luckenbach v. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U. S. 139, 39 Sup.
Ct. 53 (1918), followed in The Turret Crown, 297 Fed. 766 (C. C. A, 2d
1924), where the court held that a carrier by stipulating for the benefit
of the insurance, "whether under the guise of advances, loans or otherwise,"
could not avoid the ruling of the Luckenbach case.
5Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Payne, 199 Iowa 1008, 203 N. W. 4(1925); see Adams v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 193 Iowa 1027, 1033,
188 N. W. 823, 825 (1922).
6 50 F. (2d) 389 (C. C. A. 2d 1931) (application for writ of certiorari
is pending at the October term of the Supreme Court). The court relied
chiefly upon the case of Duplan Silk Co. v. American & Foreign Ins. Co.,
205 Fed. 724 (C. C. A. 2d 1913), where, however, the precise issue was
not the one litigated in the principal case. It was there held that insur-
ance effected by a carrier "for account of whom it may concern," if con-
strued to cover the interest of a shipper in excess of the value stipulated
in the bill of lading, is void as a rebate.
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is no doubt that the benefit of the shipper's insurance constitutes compensa-
tion of substantial value,7 and in excess of the remuneration received under
an uninsured shipment, notwithstanding the service rendered by the carrier
is identical in both cases. The prevention of this type of extra compensa-
tion might be deemed desirable not only in closing the door to abuse in
the form of favors from shipper to carrier,8 but also in taking away one
incentive for the carrier's reduction of freight rates or grant of special
privileges.9
On the other hand it is questionable whether the insurer should be re-
lieved of ultimate liability by reason of a statutory proscription totally
unrelated to its undertaking. The purpose of the Interstate Commerce
Act might have been achieved merely by requiring the carrier to reimburzo
the shipper to the amount of premiums paid. Moreover the almost uni-
versal presence of a benefit clause in bills of lading and an avoidance clause
in insurance policies renders the danger of their utilization as instruments
of deliberate discrimination largely hypothetical. Furthermore, modern
ideas of the administration of risk and the true basis of carriers' liability
would lend small support to a theory that the carrier should ultimately
bear the loss because of its "fault." Disposition of the case along these
lines would have properly left the question of unjust discrimination to
original determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
CRITERLI OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN GAS AND ELECTRICITY
WrrH the marked increase in regional superpower systems,' producing,
transmitting and distributing gas and electricity with slight regard for
state boundaries, the inadequacy of state commissions to protect the con-
suming public has become apparent. Courts, unaided by any integrating
legislation, and always bound by the implications of the Commerce clause,
have pricked out piecemeal the limits of permissible regulation. Without
determining whether wholesale companies could be regulated at all, the
Supreme Court of the United States has denied the power of states to rega-
7 Duplan Silk Co. v. American & Foreign Ins. Co., supra note 6; VuCE,
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 1-3.
8 Cf. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Westinghouse Co., 270 U. S. 260, 46 Sup.
Ct. 220 (1926). See Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Ward, 244 U. S.
283, 388, 37 Sup. Ct. 617, 619 (1917).
9 Two early cases recognized the opportunity for discrimination in the
form of reduced freight rates when the carrier stipulated for the benefit
of the insurance. See Willock v. Pennsylvania R. R., 166 Pa. St. 184, 191, 30
At. 948 (1895); Jackson Co. v. Boylston Mutual Ins. Co., 139 Blass. 50s,
512, 2 N. E. 103, 105 (1885). But see Luckenbach v. McCahan Sugar
Refining Co., supra, note 4, at 148, 39 Sup. Ct. at 55.
1 Ratio of interstate power to power generated: 1926, 9.06; 1928, 10.90;
1929, 11.84. Number of interstate crossings: 1926, 453; 1923, 510; 1929,
554. HARVARD BUREAU OF BUSINEss RESEARCH, Vol. vV, No. 9, Bulletin
No. 68 (Dec. 1927); NATIONAL ELECTRIC LIGHT ASSOCIATION STATISTICAL
BULLETIN, Nos. 4 (October 1929), 5 (June 1930). See ELSBEEE, INTER-
STATE TRANs nssION OF ELECTRIC POWLR (1931) 164, to the effect that
"nearly 15% of power generated is transmitted across state lines." See
also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON INTERSTATE MlOVEnIENT
OF ELECTRIC ENERGY, Senate Document No. 238, '71st Congress, 3d session;
U. S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, DEP'T OF INTERIOR, (1928) Water-Supply Paper
579, Plate 2, at 118; RECENT GROWTH OF THE ELECTRIC LIGHT AND PowEll
INDUSTRY (1929) Vol. I, No. 1, Pamphlet Series, The Brookings Institution;
REPORT OF THE GIANT POWER BOARD TO THE GOVERNOR OF PENNSYLYVAIA(1926) 19.
NOTES1931]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
late the rates of a local generating company selling to a foreign distributor,-
or the rates of a local supply company selling gas obtained without the
state to domestic distributors,3 because in each case the business was inter-
state. But in Pennsylvania Gas Company v. New York Public Service Com-
mission,4 the same court permitted the New York Commission to fix the
rates charged local consumers by a Pennsylvania gas producing company,
holding that the transaction was interstate, but that no direct burden wag
imposed thereon by rate regulation. More recently, however, in the case
of East Ohio Gas Company v. Ohio Tax Commission,5 it disapproved its
previous reasoning in the Pennsylvania Gas Company case, and established
a precise line of demarcation between interstate and intrastate commerce
at the point where the gas previously'moving in interstate commerce was
reduced in pressure for local consumption. On the authority of this deci-
sion a lower federal court 6 has held that electricity entering the state by
high tension transmission lines passed into intrastate commerce when
"stepped down" in voltage. Although the decisions involved the validity of
excise taxes upon the businesses of distributing gas and electricity the
criterion utilized might also be applicable in cases involving regulation.
Suggested proposals for the regulation of hitherto unregulated agencies
and for the integration of the superpower fields include interstate com-
pacts,7 federal control with regional decentralization,8 joint boards as
federal agencies,9 and federal and state cooperation with state commissions
as federal agencies.1o Underlying them all is the fundamental question
whether there should 'be a dual system based upon the Supreme Court's
delimitations of the respective spheres of interstate and intrastate com-
merce, or whether there should be complete federal control with the states
in a subordinate position. If a federal commission were created to sup-
plement existing state bodies, the distinctions between the interstate and
intrastate fields would remain vital, and the test of the Ohio Gas Company
case would become especially significant. Under the Pennsylvania Gau
Company decision, the establishment of a federal body would preclude
further state control of the rates in a similar case; by the Ohio decision
the same transaction assumes a purely intrastate character.
But integration of the protean aspects of superpower, and effective
2 Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Eloc-
tric Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294 (1927) noted in (1927) 36 YALE L.
J. 881; (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 906; (1927) 27 COL. L. R V. 615.
3 Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544
(1924). Cf. Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup.
Ct. 268 (1919).
*252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279 (1920).
* 283 U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499 (1931). But compare State Tax Commis-
sion of Mississippi v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., decided by the Supreme
Court Nov. 23, and reported in U. S. Daily, Nov. 24, 1931, at 2171.
r South Carolina Power Company v. South Carolina Tax Commission,
52 F. (2d) 515 (E. D. S. C. 1931).
7 See ELSBREE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 172-182; Frankfurter and Landis,
The Compact Clause of the Constitution (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 714 el scq.
8 See MOSHER, ELECTRICAL UTILITIES (1929) 144, 145; ELSBREE, op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 182.
0 See PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Vol. VIII, No. 9 (Oct. 29, 1931)
at 562.
10 REYNOLDS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATH1
CARRIERS BETWEEN THE NATION AND THE STATES. (1928) 382-391; ELS-'
BREE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 192. See Smith, What I Think About Federat
and State Regulation, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Vol. VIII, No. 11
(Nov. 26, 1931) at 654-661.
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regulation of holding companies and distributors would seem to demand
a more unified system of control. The wide scope of the powers of the
Interstate Commerce Commission over the railroads and telephone and
telegraph companies indicates the extent to which interstate considerations
become controlling when federal regulation enters the scene. The tendency
of the states to view every problem in the light of their own interests,
shown by their failure to agree on any point in the most recently attempted
interstate conference in this field 12 presages the impossibility of effective
cooperation under any dual system. The development of superpower
foreshadows an economic structure regional if not nation-wide, in which
state boundaries play no part and in which control should rather be
coterminous with the superpower zone.13
DEPosrroa's PREFERENCE BASED ON MlISREPRESENTATIO N OF SOLVENCY Or
REFUSAL OF PAYmENT
IN the case of Mallett v. Tunuicliffe I a depositor in a bank was dissuaded
from withdrawing her funds from a savings account by the fraudulent
misrepresentations of an officer of the bank with regard to its solvency.
Subsequently, the bank adopted a rule requiring sixty days' notice of in-
tention to withdraw funds, and notified the depositor thereof. When later
she presented a check for part of her funds, the bank refused payment,
insisting on sLxty days' notice. Upon the bank's insolvency and the ap-
pointment of a receiver the depositor claimed a preference. A divided
court held that although she was not entitled by the fraudulent dissuasion
to a preference for her entire account, yet the subsequent notice of in-
tention to withdraw effected a segregation of the funds demanded and
created a preference for the amount of the check.
It is settled that a fraudulent representation of the solvency of a bank
inducing a deposit therein will enable the depositor to claim a preference
on the theory of a constructive trust.2 On the other hand a number of
decisions have held that where the fraud merely supervenes to permit a
retention of funds on deposit the relation of debtor and creditor is not
141 holding companies own or control 3,108 of the approximate total of
4,196 operating companies, thus controlling a little more than 82 per cent
of all the electric power generated in the United States and providing 83
per cent of the country's population with electric energy. See PINcHoT,
THE POWER MONOPOLY (1928) 2, 3.
-12 Attempted tri-state compact between Pennsylvania, New York and New
Jersey. See REPORT OF THE GL&NT POWER BOARD TO THE GOVENOR OF PfNx-
syLvANu (Dec. 7, 1926) 157-183; ELSBREE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 172.
But see Donovan, Interstate Compaets (1931) 80 U. of PA. L. REV. 5, 14.
23 See Department of the Interior, United States Geological Survey
(1921) Professional Paper 123, at 14, Plate II, showing a superpower
zone which takes in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, the portion
of New York east of Utica, Pennsylvania east of Harrisburg, and most
of New Jersey and Maryland. Cf. Dep't of Interior, United States Geological
Survey, (1923) Water Supply Paper No. 493. See Bonbright & Co., A
Survey of Electric Power and Light Companies of the United States
(1923).
1136 So. 346 (Fla. 1931) aff'd on rehearing, U. S. Daily, Nov. 4, 1931,
at 2012.
2 Richardson v. New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co., 102 Fed. 7S0
(C. C. A. 5th 1900) ; Holloway v. Dykes, 29 F. (2d) 430 (N. D. Okla. 1923) ;




altered.3 But so far as it concerns the creation of a trust it would seem
immaterial whether the fraud occurred at the inducement of the contract
or subsequently thereto since the "constructive trust" is merely a label de-
scriptive of the nature and extent of a remedy based on fraud. 4 Thus a
constructive trust has been impressed on property originally acquired
without fraud, but thereafter fraudulently retained.5 To entitle ,a deposi-
tor to a preference, however, the existence of fraud sufficient to create
a trust must be accompanied by a showing that the trust funds augmented
the insolvent's assets and were not dissipated before reaching the receiver.0
In the instant case, where the assets were the same after as before the
transaction, the court was unable to find any augmentation. It is possible,
however, to apply the principle that, where acts have been fraudulently pre-
vented, equity will consider them as in fact consummated, and thereby to
regard the transaction as if the depositor had checked out his money and
then redeposited it.7 Aided by similar reasoning many courts have held
that, where a drawee pays the bank holding an item for collection by a
check drawn against its deposit therein, and the collecting bank fails before
remitting to the owner, the assets of the collecting bank are thereby in-
creased.8
On the other hand, it is difficult to agree with the court's conclusion that
the depositor was entitled to a preference for part of the aicount by more
notice of withdrawal. While no case raising this precise point has been
found, the decision is clearly out of harmony with analogous cases holding
that a demand for payment will not alter the debtor-creditor relation be-
tween bank and customer so as to entitle the demandant to a preferred
claim even though the bank has acknowledged its obligation.0 Nor does the
issuance of a cashier's check or a certificate of deposit for the amount de-
manded entitle the depositor to a preference.10 And even if the court
could be sustained in holding that notice effects a segregation of the funds,
the depositor would still not be entitled to assert a preferred claim in the
absence of a finding of augmentation of assets.'1 The decision of the
court forcefully illustrates the fortuitous results of the utilization of the
3 Rankin v. Banking Corporations of Montana, 77 Mont. 134, 251 Pac.
151 (1926) ; Venner v. Cox, 35 S. W. 769 (Tenn. 1895). Contra: Ex part,
Herulen, 156 S. C. 181, 153 8. E. 133 (1930).
4 1 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) 268, 269.
Lewis v. Lindley, 19 Mont..422, 48 Pac. 765 (1897) ; Arntson v. Sheldon
First National Bank, 39 N. D. 408, 167 N, W. 760 (1918).
6 Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1150; Note (1922) 20 A. L. R. 206.7 Fralick v. Coeur D'Alene Bank & Trust Co., 36 Idaho 108, 210 Pac. 580
(1922); City of Sturgis v. Meade County Bank, 38 S. D. 317, 161 N. V.
327 (1917).
8 State National Bank v. First National Bank, 124 Ark. 531, 187 S. W.
673 (1926) ; Messenger v. Carroll Trust & Savings Bank, 193 Iowa 608, 187
N. W. 545 (1922). The federal courts and some state courts hold that
there has been no augmentation. Larabee Flour Mills v. First National
Bank, 13 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th 1926); North Carolina Corporation
Commission v. Merchants' & Farmers' Bank, 137 N. C. 697, 50 S. E, 308
(1905). See generally Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 456
0 Aachen & Munich Fire Insurance Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 39 F.
(2d) 578 (C. C. A. 2d 1930); St. Mary's Church v. National Bank, 23
Misc. 588, 52 N. Y. Supp. 802 (1898) ; Dahl & Penne v. State Bank of Port-
land, 110 Ore. 68, 222 Pac. 1090 (1924) (bank mistakenly paid $1000 less
than amount of check.
10 Taylor v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 39 S. W. (2d) 724 (Ark. 1931);
Washington Shoe Manufacturing Co. v. Duke, 126 Wash. 510, 218 Pac.
232 (1923).
11 Cf. Note (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1150.
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trust device for the purpose of making distinctions between the claims
of creditors of insolvent banks.12
CORPORATE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH QUALIFICATION STATUTES--INDIVIDUAL
LiABiLrry OF AGENTS
INDIVIDuAL liability of officers and agents transacting business in behalf
of a foreign corporation which has failed to comply with the qualifying
statutes has been made a statutory penalty in a number of states.1 Such
liability has also been judicially imposed in the absence of an express stat-
ute on the theory that a foreign corporation has no extra-territorial exist-
ence before compliance, from which it is reasoned that its representatives 2
are liable either as agents attempting to bind an incompetent or non-exist-
ent principal,3 or as partners in an unincorporated venture.4 The incon-
sistency of this position, however, with the terms of the qualifying stat-
utes has lead nearly all of the later decisions to reach the opposite con-
clusion in determining the effect of mere non-compliance.3
Exemplifying this clearly discernible trend is a recent decision of the
Florida Supreme CourtG which held that by permitting a non-complying
foreign corporation to acquire a valid title to real estate, the statute had
recognized, for that purpose, the existence of the corporate entity prior
to compliance, and therefore denied the plaintiff's power to hold the officers
individually liable on purchase notes signed by them in behalf of the
12 For a criticism of the policy of allowing preferences in the assets of
an insolvent collecting bank see Bogert, Failed Banhs, Collection Items,
and Trust Preferences (1931) 29 MICH. L. REv. 545, 566. But cf. Turner,
Bank Collections-The Direct Routing Practice (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 468,
487.
1CoLo. ComP. LAWS (1921) § 2324 (also includes stockholders), applied
in Keeler v. Union Trust Co., 84 Colo. 353, 270 Pac. 867 (1928); IDAHo
ComP. STAT. (1919) § 4777; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 181, § 5; N. D.
ComP. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 5241 (also includes stockholders), applied in
Chesley v. Soo Lignite Coal Co., 19 N. D. 18, 121 N. W. 73 (1909) ; UTAH
ComP. LAWS t1917) § 947; VA. CODE ANN. (1930) § 3848; WYo. ComP.
STAT. ANN. (1920) § 5449 (also includes stockholders). But such a sec-
tion has been construed as having no application to officers and agents
-who have never been present in the state engaged in carrying on the busi-
ness of the non-complying corporation. Richmond Standard Steel Co. v.
Dinninny, 105 Va. 439, 53 S. E. 961 (1906).
2 Although the language of the courts is broad enough to include all
officers, agents, directors, and in some instances even stockholders, lia-
bility has actually been imposed only on those actively engaged in trans-
acting business on behalf of the non-complying foreign corporation. See
cases iafra notes 3 and 4.
3Ryerson & Son v. Shaw, 277 Ill. 524, 115 N. E. 650 (1917), noted in
(1917) 27 YALE L. J. 248 and (1917) 12 ILL. L. REV. 207; Peacock Coal Co.
v. Gaines Coal Co., 206 Iowa 1228, 219 N. W. 24 (1928); Lasher v. Stimson,
145 Pa. 30, 23 Atl. 552 (1892). In support of this view see Ladd, Liability
of Individuals Conducting the Affairs of a Foreign Corporation Not Au-
thorized to do Business in Iowa (1930) 15 IowA L. REv. 285.
4 Cunningham v. Shelby, 136 Tenn. 176, 188 S. W. 1147 (1916); Rowden
v. Daniell, 151 Mo. App. 15, 132 S. W. 23 (1910).
;Where the non-compliance of a foreign corporation is fraudulent, or
when the corporation is engaged in a business forbidden by the jurisdiction
to corporations, the problem is of course different, and individual liability
is justly imposed. Mandeville v. Courtright, 142 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 3d 1905);
Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 205 S. W. 633 (1918).
G Pape v. Finch, 136 So. 496 (Fla. 1931).
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corporation. More frequently in denying individual liability by reference
to statutory indication of corporate existence, the courts have relied on
the provision, included in most qualifying statutes, which subjects non-
complying corporations to suit at all times.7 Additional support for such
a ruling has been found in statutory provisions validating the contracts,
of a foreign corporation made before compliance,8 and also in provisions.
withholding the right to sue on such contracts only until the corporation
has removed the disqualification of non-compliance. 9 Furthermore, the
mere absence of any provision making the dealings of the corporation
null and void or subjecting the corporate representatives to individual
liability has been held sufficient grounds to deny such liability.1o A lik.
result has been reached in one jurisdiction by distinguishing its qualifying
statutes, which merely direct a foreign corporation to comply, from thos&
which prohibit a foreign corporation from doing business before qualify-
ing."7 But an analysis of the cases does not warrant resort to such a distinc-
tion either as a reconciliation of the conflicting decisions or as a test for
the imposition of individual liability.'
2
In addition to being more satisfactory logically, the rejection of indi-
vidual liability as a concommitant of corporate non-compliance works no,
injustice to those having claims against the corporation. Estopped from
using the fact of its non-compliance as a defense, even in the absence of
statutory liability to suit,' 3 the corporation is always answerable to ita
creditors, who having been injured through corporate acts, are entitled
to no more than the corporate responsibility which is thus accorded them.
If it is in the interest of the state to secure compliance by foreign corpora-
tions for purposes of jurisdiction, taxation, and control, the legislature
has already provided means by which offending corporations may be pun-
ished or ousted, and it would seem unwarrantable for the courts to supple-
ment such penalties by superimposing a personal liability upon their repro-
sentatives.14
7 American Soap Co. v. Bogue, 114 Ohio St. 149, 150 N. E. 743 (1926)
Bala Corporation v. McGlinn, 295 Pa. 74, 144 Atl. 823 (1929) ; Martin Bros.
v. Nettleton, 138 Wash. 102, 244 Pac. 386 (1926) (interpretation of Oregon
qualifying statutes).
8 Bala Corporation v. McGlinn, supra note 7.
9 Bala Corporation v. McGlinn; American Soap Co. v. Bogue, both
supra note 7.
10 Beal v. Childress, 92 Kan. 109, 139 Pac. 1198 (1914); Pierce v.
Yeaton, 78 N. H. 378, 100 Atl. 604 (1917); of. Shawmut Paper Co. V.
Auerbach, 214 Mass. 363, 101 N. E. 1000 (1913). See also National Bank
of Wichita v. Spot Cash Coal Co., 98 Ark. 597, 605, 606, 136 S. W. 953,
956 (1911).
11 Springfield Grocery Co. v. Devitt, 126 Miss. 169, 88 So. 497 (1921).
12 Decisions under the Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania prohibitory
qualifying statutes have refused imposition of individual liability, and
even where the statutes have been construed as directory, a prohibition
has been implied from the penalty imposed for non-compliance. Quartette.
Music Co. v. Haygood, 108 Miss. 755, 67 So. 211 (1915).
13 Young v. Gaus, 134 Mo. App. 166, 113 S. W. 735 (1908) ; BALLANTINII,
MANUAL OF CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE (1930) § 289.
14 State v. Gas Co., 71 Kan. 785, 81 Pac. 506 (1905) (qiw warranto pro-
ceedings); BEALE, FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (1904) § 216; BALLANTINE. COR-
PORATIONS (1927) § 286.
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FORECLOSURE OF VENDOR'S LIE' O\ PROPERTY SOLD TO MUNICIPAL
CORPORA.TION
A mUNICIPAL corporation purchased an engine and pump for installation
in a newly-erected municipal waterworks. Payment was made, partly in
cash, partly in notes secured by a vendor's lien and chattel mortgage on
the machinery. Upon the town's default in payment of the notes, a holder
in due course sought to foreclose the lien and mortgage. A decree per-
petually enjoining the foreclosure was affirmed I on the sole ground that the
machinery, as part of the waterworks, had become public property dedicated
to public use, and therefore exempt from seizure and sale.
The accepted rule that public property is not subject to execution for a
general debt 2 is not so generally applied when the debt arises from the
purchase of the property itself. For example, where land was conveyed
to a city for purposes of a reservoir, it was held upon default in pay-
ment of the purchase price, that the vendor was entitled either to recover
the sum due or to foreclose an implied vendor's lien on the land.3 Again
-where machinery was sold to a contractor for installation in a municipal
plant, the vendor expressly retaining title until payment, and the city
subsequently took over the work after abandonment by the contractor, it
-was held that if the city had been duly notified of the conditional character
of the sale, the vendor was entitled to recover the propelty.' Moreover, in
the event that a contract of sale entered into by a municipal corporation
is declared void, although the vendor cannot recover the purchase price,5 he
can recover the property sold, whether or not it has been dedicated to
public use.6
Disregarding these specific limitations the court in the principal case
relied on the general rule applicable to foreclosure on municipal property.
It also assumed without questioning that title to the machinery was in
the town. But it is arguable that the corporation owned only the interest
represented by the cash payment; title to the balance, by virtue of the ex-
press lien and chattel mortgage, resting in the vendor until payment was
completed on the notes. Even if the fiction be adopted that title passed
.to the city and back to the vendor with the lien and mortgage, the practical
result of the decision is a deprivation of property without just compensa-
tion, and seems scarcely warranted even by the desirability of maintaining
the municipal water works intact.
I Town of Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co., 136 So. 82 (La. 1931).
2 Equitable Loan & Security Co. v. Edwardsville, 143 Ala. 182, 38 So.
1016 (1904) (judgment); Porter v. Town of Ville Platte, 158 La. 342, 104
So. 67 (1925) (mechanic's lien). For discussion of principles involved,
see 3 DILLON, MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 992.
3 Fort Worth v. Reynolds, 190 S. W. 501 (Tex. 1916) (land not ezsential
to city water supply).
4 Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Ellensburg, 108 Wash. 533, 185 Pac. 811 (1919).
In the absence of due notice, recovery has been denied. Peck-Hammond
Co. v. Walnut Ridge School District, 93 Ark. 77, 123 S. W. '771 (1909);
Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Atlantic, 164 Iowa 8, 144 N. W. 346 (1913).
5 Greenburg Iron Co. v. Abbevile, 2 F. (2d) 559 (C. C. A. 5th 1924).
Nor can recovery be had on q2tanhun me;udt. La France Fire Engine Co.
-v. Syracuse, 33 Misc. Rep. 516, 68 N. Y. Supp. 894 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
Chapman v. Douglas County, 107 U. S. 348, 2 Sup. Ct. 62 (1883);
La France Fire Engine Co. v. Syracuse, supra note 5 (fire apparatus);
Lee v. Monroe County, 114 Fed. 744 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902) (bridge); Harri-
son County v. Smith's Adm'rs, 15 B. Mon. 155 (Ky. 1854) (jail). Contra:
McCrary v. City of Glennville, 149 Ga. 431, 100 S. E. 3G2 (1919).
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RESTRICTIVE PROVISIONS IN TRUST INDENTURES AGAINST ACTIONS BY
INDIvIDuAL BONDHOLDERS
THE rights of individual holders of corporate bonds and notes to proceed
against the security,' or to sue for the principal debt upon acceleration of
its maturity2 are derived solely from specific provisions of the trust in-
denture and the bonds, and are subject to the limitations therein expressed
or implied. But the common law right to sue on the obligation at maturity
exists in the absence of express provision,3 and is said to be of too high
a character to be taken away by implication. 4 It is not destroyed by the
typical provision in mortgage indentures prohibiting any suit which would
prejudice the lien of the security,5 nor by a waiver of default on the
part of the holders of a majority of the bonds0 With the increasing preva-
lence of widely scattered holdings in corporate securities, however, it be-
came desirable to establish the trustee as the representative of all bond-
holders some of whom might find it more difficult than others to sue in-
dividually, and furthermore to prevent a multitude of capricious suits tend-
ing to precipitate disaster to the company from conditions which might
present only temporary difficulties. Accordingly as a protection for the
general security, modern indentures commonly stipulate that no bondholder
shall bring suit unless the trustee fails to act after having been requested
to do so by the hofders of a specified percentage of the bonds outstanding.
To give any operative effect to such a restriction, notice thereof con-
tained in the bond must apparently be more compelling than is required
ordinarily to incorporate a separate agreement into commercial paper.t
1 Belleville Savings Bank v. Mercantile Trust Co., 194 Ill, App. 175
(1915); Mayo v. Fitchburg & Leominster St. Ry., 269 Mass. 118, 168 N.
E. 405 (1929); cf. Home Mortgage Co. v. Ramsey, 49 F. (2d) 738 (C. C.
A. 4th 1931) (bondholder not entitled to appointment of receiver of cor-
poration).
2 Batchelder v. Council Grove Water Co., 131 N. Y. 42, 29 N. t. 801
(1892); cf. Grant v. Winona & Southwestern Ry. Co., 85 Minn. 422, 89
N. W. 60 (1902) (power to sue for deficiency judgment vested in trustee,
bondholder denied right to sue for same before maturity date).
Fleming v. Fairmont & Mannington R. R., 72 W. Va. 835, 79 S. E.
826 (1913).
4 See Manning v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 29 Fed. 838, 839 (E, D. Va.
1887) ; Romberg v. Interstate Independent Telephone & Telegraph Co., 20D
Ill. App. 509, 513 (1916). But see Batchelder v. Council Grove Water Co.,
supra note 2, at 46, 29 N. E. at 801.
5 Brown v. Michigan R. R., 124 Misc. 630, 207 N. Y. Supp. 630 (City
Court, Spec. Term, 1924). Cont'a: Bartol v. Gottlieb-Bauernschmldt-
Straus Brewing Co., 129 Md. 32, 98 Atl. 286 (1916). Cf. Barker v. Utah-
Idaho Central R. R., 57 Utah 494, 195 Pac. 635 (1921).
6 Manning v. Norfolk Southern R. R., supra note 4; Mayo v. Fitchburg
& Leominster St. Ry., supra note 1; cf. McClelland v. Norfolk Southern
R. R., 110 N. Y. 469, 18 N. E. 237 (1888). Nor is it a defense to such an
action by an individual holder that a judgment would be worthless because
not executable on the mortgaged property. See Kimber v. Gunnell Gold
Mining & Milling Co., 126 Fed. 137, 140 (C. C. A. 8th 1903).
7 Guilford v. Minneapolis Sault Ste. Marie & Atlantic Ry., 48 Minn. 560,
51 N. W. 658 (1892) ("secured by a mortgage" insufficient notice); Roths-
child v. Rio Grande Western R. R., 84 Hun 103 (Sup. Ct. 1895) ("subject
to the provisions of the trust agreement" insufficient). The phrase "refer-
ence is made to the indenture for the rights of the bondholders in respect
to the security and the bonds" is generally held to give sufficient notice.
Moreover it has been said that the recordation of the mortgage gives con-
structive notice. Belleville Savings Bank v. Southern Coal & Mining Co.,
173 Ill. App. 250, 253 (1912).
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But where the requisite notice is present, the great majority of courts
will give effect to the provision.8 In New York, however, repeated dicta
by the lower courts,9 revealing a disposition clearly opposed to the validity
of such restrictions, were eventually given the effect of an adjudication in
the case of Berman v. Consoli&ted Nevada-Utah Corporation,1o where the
Supreme Court concluded that the primary obligation contained in the bond
and the limitation of the indenture were inconsistent, and that the former
should prevail. It is significant, however, that in a subsequent case",' in-
volving the identical problem, another Justice of the Supreme Court found
himself unable to follow the decision in the Bcrman case. And in a more
.recent decision a federal district court held that to deny a holder of an
unsecured serial note the right to sue at maturity achieved the desirable
end of protecting the holders"of unmatured notes and on the other hand
worked no hardship in view of the equitable remedy remaining against the
trustee in the event of his failure to act. 2 The argument that the validity
of the restriction would be incompatible with the negotiability of the in-
strument 13 may be nullified, in some states, including New York, by
legislation designed to make all corporate bonds negotiable regardless of
the requirements of the Negotiable Instrument Law.1 And in any event
it appears reasonable to suppose that an instrument might be deemed
negotiable to the extent that it passes good title to an innocent purchaser,
and yet subject him to terms expressly incorporated in the instrument by
reference to another agreement which operate not to condition the obliga-
tion of the maker but to waive certain rights of the individual holders.
8 Crosthwaite v. Moline Plow Co., 298 Fed. 466 (S. D. N. Y. 1924) ; Allan
v. Moline Plow Co., 14 F. (2d) 912 (C. C. A. 8th 1926); Boley v. Lake St.
Elevated R. R., 64 Ill. App. 305 (1896); Muren v. Southern Coal & Mining
Co., 177 Mo. App. 600, 160 S. W. 835 (1913). But where the trustee is to
be appointed only at the option of a majority of the holders upon the default
of the company, no provision in the indenture can prevent individual suit.
Goodjon v. United Bond & Building Corporation, 226 App. Div. 137, 234
N. Y. Supp. 522 (4th Dep't 1929). Cf. Mack v. American Electric Tel. Co.,
79 N. J. L. 109, 74 Atl. 263 (1909).
9 See Rothschild v. Rio Grande Western R. R., supra note 7, at 109;
General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 200 App. Div.
794, 801, 193 N. Y. Supp. 903, 909 (1st Dep't 1922), ajfd 235 N. Y. 133,
139 N. E. 216 (1923); Goodjon v. United Bond & Building Corporation,
.supra note 8, at 141, 234 N. Y. Supp. at 527; cf. Enoch v. Brandon, 249
N. Y. 263, 269, 164 N. E. 45, 47 (1928).
1 132 Misc. 462, 230 N. Y. Supp. 421 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
1 Rudick v. Ulster & Delaware R. R., reported in N. Y. Law Journal,
October 10, 1928, at 175.
1 -Lidgerwood v. Hale & Kilburn Corporation, 47 F. (2d) 318 (S. D.
N. Y. 1930).
13 See Rothschild v. Rio Grande Western R. R., supra note 7, at 109.
133 8 SWAiNE, SOmE LEGAL PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING (1930) 172.
14 N. Y. PERSONAL PRoPERTY LAW (1930) art. 8, §§ 260-262. Note (1930)
40 YALE L. J. 261.
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